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Abstract
Reinforcement Learning agents are expected to
eventually perform well. Typically, this takes the
form of a guarantee about the asymptotic behav-
ior of an algorithm given some assumptions about
the environment. We present an algorithm for a
policy whose value approaches the optimal value
with probability 1 in all computable probabilistic
environments, provided the agent has a bounded
horizon. This is known as strong asymptotic op-
timality, and it was previously unknown whether it
was possible for a policy to be strongly asymptot-
ically optimal in the class of all computable prob-
abilistic environments. Our agent, Inquisitive Re-
inforcement Learner (Inq), is more likely to ex-
plore the more it expects an exploratory action to
reduce its uncertainty about which environment it
is in, hence the term inquisitive. Exploring inquis-
itively is a strategy that can be applied generally;
for more manageable environment classes, inquis-
itiveness is tractable. We conducted experiments
in “grid-worlds” to compare the Inquisitive Rein-
forcement Learner to other weakly asymptotically
optimal agents.
1 Introduction
“Efforts to solve [an instance of the exploration-
exploitation problem] so sapped the energies and
minds of Allied analysts that the suggestion was
made that the problem be dropped over Germany,
as the ultimate instrument of intellectual sabotage.”
–Peter Whittle [Whittle, 1979]
The Allied analysts were considering the simplest possible
problem in which there is a trade-off to be made between
exploiting, taking the apparently best option, and exploring,
choosing a different option to learn more. We tackle what
we consider the most difficult instance of the exploration-
exploitation trade-off problem: when the environment could
be any computable probability distribution, not just a multi-
armed bandit, how can one achieve optimal performance in
the limit?
∗Contact Author
Our work is within the Reinforcement Learning (RL)
paradigm: an agent selects an action, and the environment
responds with an observation and a reward. The interaction
may end, or it may continue forever. Each interaction cycle
is called a timestep. The agent has a discount function that
weights its relative concern for the reward it achieves at vari-
ous future timesteps. The agent’s job is to select actions that
maximize the total expected discounted reward it achieves in
its lifetime. The “value” of an agent’s policy at a certain point
in time is the expected total discounted reward it achieves af-
ter that time if it follows that policy. One formal specification
of the exploration-exploitation problem is: what policy can an
agent follow so that the policy’s value approaches the value
of the optimal informed policy with probability 1, even when
the agent doesn’t start out knowing the true dynamics of its
environment?
Most work in RL makes strong assumptions about the en-
vironment—that the environment is Markov, for instance.
Impressive recent development in the field of reinforcement
learning often makes use of the Markov assumption, includ-
ing Deep Q Networks [Mnih et al., 2015], A3C [Mnih et al.,
2016], Rainbow [Hessel et al., 2018], and AlphaZero [Silver
et al., 2017]. Another example of making strong assumptions
in RL comes from some model-based algorithms that implic-
itly assume that the environment is representable by, for ex-
ample, a fixed-size neural network, or whatever construct is
used to model the environment. We do not make any such
assumptions.
Many recent developments in RL are largely about
tractably learning to exploit; how to explore intelligently
is a separate problem. We address the latter problem.
Our approach, inquisitiveness, is based on Orseau et al.’s
[2013] Knowledge Seeking Agent for Stochastic Environ-
ments, which selects the actions that best inform the agent
about what environment it is in. Our Inquisitive Reinforce-
ment Learner (Inq) explores like a knowledge seeking agent,
and is more likely to explore when there is apparently (ac-
cording to its current beliefs) more to be learned. Some-
times exploring well requires “expeditions,” or many consec-
utive exploratory actions. Inq entertains expeditions of all
lengths, although it follows the longer ones less often, and it
doesn’t resolutely commit in advance to seeing the expedition
through.
This is a very human approach to information acquisition.
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When we spot an opportunity to learn something about our
natural environment, we feel inquisitive. We get distracted.
We are inclined to check it out, even if we don’t see directly
in advance how this information might help us better achieve
our goals. Moreover, if we can tell that the opportunity to
learn something requires a longer term project, we may find
ourselves less inquisitive.
For the class of computable environments (stochastic envi-
ronments that follow a computable probability distribution),
it was previously unknown whether any policy could achieve
strong asymptotic optimality (convergence of the value to op-
timality with probability 1). Lattimore et al. [2011] showed
that no deterministic policy could achieve this. The key ad-
vantage that stochastic policies have is that they can let the
exploration probability go to 0 while still exploring infinitely
often. (For example, an agent that explores with probability
1/t at time t still explores infinitely often).
There is a weaker notion of optimality–“weak asymptotic
optimality”–for which positive results already exist; this con-
dition requires that the average value over the agent’s life-
time approach optimality. Lattimore et al. [2011] identified a
weakly asymptotically optimal agent for deterministic com-
putable environments; the agent maintains a list of environ-
ments consistent with its observations, exploiting as if it is
in the first such one, and exploring in bursts. A recent algo-
rithm for a Thompson Sampling Bayesian agent was shown,
with an elegant proof, to be weakly asymptotically optimal in
all computable environments, but not strongly asymptotically
optimal [Leike et al., 2016].
Most work in RL regards (Partially Observable) Markov
Decision Processes (PO)MDPs. However, environments
that enter completely novel states infinitely often render
(PO)MDP algorithms helpless. For example, an RL agent
acting as a chatbot, optimizing a function, or proving mathe-
matical theorems would struggle to model the environment as
an MDP, and would likely require an exploration mechanism
like ours. In the chatbot case, for instance, as a conversation
with a person progresses, the person never returns to the same
state.
If we formally compare Inq to existing algorithms in
MDPs, we find that many achieve asymptotic optimality.
Epsilon-greedy, upper confidence bound, and Thompson
sampling exploration strategies suffice in MDPs. Our primary
motivation is for the sorts of environments described above.
To discriminate between exploratory approaches in ergodic
MDPs, one can formally bound regret, and we would like to
do this for Inq in the future.
For comparison, some algorithms which use the MDP for-
malism also consider information-theoretic approaches to ex-
ploration, such as VIME [Houthooft et al., 2016], the agent
in [Still, 2009], and TEXPLORE-VANIR [Hester and Stone,
2012].
In Section 2, we formally describe the RL setup and present
notation. In Section 3, we present the algorithm for Inq.
In Section 4, we prove our main result: that Inq is strongly
asymptotically optimal. In Section 5, we present experimen-
tal results comparing Inq to weakly asymptotically optimal
agents. Finally, we discuss the relevance of this exploration
regime to tractable algorithms. Appendix A collates notation
and definitions for quick reference. Appendix B contains the
proofs of the lemmas.
2 Notation
We follow the notation of Orseau, et al. [2013]. The rein-
forcement learning setup is as follows: A is a finite set of
actions available to the agent; O is a finite set of observa-
tions it might observe, and R = [0, 1] ∩ Q is the set of
possible rewards. The set of all possible interactions in a
timestep is H := A × O × R. At every timestep, one el-
ement from this set occurs. A reinforcement learner’s policy
pi is a stochastic function which outputs an action given an in-
teraction history, denoted by pi : H∗  A. (X ∗ := ⋃∞i=0 X i
represents all finite strings from an alphabet X ). An envi-
ronment is a stochastic function which outputs an observa-
tion and reward given an interaction history and an action:
ν : H∗×A O×R. For a stochastic function f : X → Y ,
f(y|x) denotes the probability that f outputs y ∈ Y when
x ∈ X is input.
A policy and an environment induce a probability measure
overH∞, the set of all possible infinite histories: for h ∈ H∗,
Ppiν (h) denotes the probability that an infinite history begins
with h when actions are sampled from the policy pi, and ob-
servations and rewards are sampled from the environment ν.
Formally, we define this inductively: Ppiν () 7→ 1, where  is
the empty history, and for h ∈ H∗, a ∈ A, o ∈ O, r ∈ R,
we define Ppiν (haor) 7→ Ppiν (h)pi(a|h)ν(or|ha). In an infinite
history h1:∞ ∈ H∞, at, ot, and rt refer to the tth action, ob-
servation and reward, and ht refers to the tth timestep: atotrt.
h<t refers to the first t − 1 timesteps, and ht:k refers to the
string of timesteps t through k (inclusive). Strings of actions,
observations, and rewards are notated similarly.
A Bayesian agent deems a class of environments a priori
feasible. Its “beliefs” take the form of a probability distribu-
tion over which environment is the true one. We call this the
agent’s belief distribution. In our formulation, Inq considers
any computable environment feasible, and starts with a prior
belief distribution based on the environments’ Kolmogorov
complexities: that is, the length of the shortest program that
computes the environment on some reference machine. How-
ever, all our results hold as long as the true environment is
contained in the class of environments that are considered
feasible, and as long as the prior belief distribution assigns
nonzero probability to each environment in the class. We
takeM to be the class of all computable environments, and
w(ν) := 2−K(ν)(1+ε)/N to be the prior probability of the en-
vironment ν, where K is the Kolmogorov complexity, ε > 0,
and N is a normalization constant. (ε > 0 ensures the prior
has finite entropy, which facilitates analysis.) A smaller class
with a different prior probability could easily be substituted
forM and w(ν).
We use ξ to denote the agent’s beliefs about future ob-
servations. Together with a policy pi it defines a Bayesian
mixture measure: Ppiξ (·) :=
∑
ν∈M w(ν) P
pi
ν (·). The poste-
rior belief distribution of the agent after observing a history
h ∈ H∗ is w(ν|h) := w(ν) Ppi′ν (h)/Ppi
′
ξ (h). This definition
is independent of the choice of pi′ as long as Ppi
′
ξ (h) > 0;
we can fix a reference policy pi′ just for this definition if we
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like. We sometimes also refer to the conditional distribution
ξ(or|ha) := ∑ν∈M w(ν|h)ν(or|ha).
The agent’s discount at a timestep is denoted γt. To
normalize the agent’s policy’s value to [0, 1], we introduce
Γt :=
∑∞
k=t γk. (Normalization makes value convergence
nontrivial). We consider an agent with a bounded horizon:
∀ε > 0 ∃m ∀t : Γt+m/Γt ≤ ε. Intuitively, this means that
the agent does not become more and more farsighted over
time. Note this does not require a finite horizon. A classic
discount function giving a bounded horizon is a geometric
one: for 0 ≤ γ < 1, γt = γt. The value of a policy pi in an
environment ν, given a history h<t ∈ Ht−1, is
V piν (h<t) :=
1
Γt
Epiν
[ ∞∑
k=t
γkrk
∣∣∣∣∣ h<t
]
(1)
Here, the expectation is with respect to the probability mea-
sure Ppiν . Reinforcement Learning is the attempt to find a pol-
icy that makes this value high, without access to ν.
3 Inquisitive Reinforcement Learner
We first describe how Inq exploits, then how it explores. It
exploits by maximizing the discounted sum of its reward in
expectation over its current beliefs, and it explores by fol-
lowing maximally informative “exploratory expeditions” of
various lengths.
An optimal policy with respect to an environment ν is a
policy that maximizes the value.
pi∗ν(·) := argmax
pi∈Π
V piν (·) (2)
where Π = H∗  A is the space of all policies. An opti-
mal deterministic policy always exists [Lattimore and Hutter,
2014b]. When exploiting, Inq simply maximizes the value
according to its belief distribution ξ. Since this policy is de-
terministic, we write a∗(h<t) to mean the unique action at
time t for which pi∗ξ (a|h<t) = 1. That is the exploitative ac-
tion.
The most interesting feature of Inq is how it gets distracted
by the opportunity to explore. Inq explores to learn. An agent
has learned from an observation if its belief distribution w
changes significantly after making that observation. If the be-
lief distribution has hardly changed, then the observation was
not very informative. The typical information-theoretic mea-
sure for how well a distributionQ approximates a distribution
P is the KL-divergence, KL(P ||Q). Thus, a principled way
to quantify the information that an agent gains in a timestep
is the KL-divergence from the belief distribution at time t+ 1
to the belief distribution at time t. This is the rationale be-
hind the construction of Orseau, et al.’s [2013] Knowledge
Seeking Agent, which maximizes this expected information
gain.
Letting h<t ∈ Ht−1 and h′ ∈ H∗, the information gain at
time t is defined:
IG(h′|h<t) :=
∑
ν∈M
w(ν|h<th′) log w(ν|h<th
′)
w(ν|h<t) (3)
Recall that w(ν|h) is the posterior probability assigned to ν
after observing h.
Figure 1: Example Expeditions. Expeditions maximize the ex-
pected KL-divergence from the posterior at the end to the posterior
at the beginning.
An m-step expedition, denoted αm, represents all contin-
gencies for how an agent will act for the next m timesteps. It
is a deterministic policy that takes history-fragments of length
less than m and returns an action:
αm :
m−1⋃
i=0
Hi → A (4)
Pα
m
ξ (h<t+k|h<t) is a conditional distribution defined for
0 ≤ k ≤ m, which represents the conditional probability
of observing h<t+k if the expedition αm is followed start-
ing at time t, after observing h<t. Now we can consider the
information-gain value of an m-step expedition. It is the ex-
pected information gain upon following that expedition:
V IG(αm, h<t) :=∑
ht:t+m−1∈Hm
Pα
m
ξ (h<t+m|h<t) IG(ht:t+m−1|h<t) (5)
At a time t, one might consider many expeditions: the
one-step expedition which maximizes expected information
gain, the two-step expedition doing the same, etc. Or one
might consider carrying on with an expedition that began
three timesteps ago.
Definition 1. At time t, the m-k expedition is the m-step ex-
pedition beginning at time t−k which maximized the expected
information gain from that point.1
αIGm,k(h<t) := argmax
αm :
⋃m−1
i=0 Hi→A
V IG(αm, h<t−k) (6)
Example expeditions are diagrammed in Figure 1.
Expeditions are functions which return an action given
what has been seen so far on the expedition. The m-k ex-
ploratory action is the action to take at time t according to the
m-k expedition:
aIGm,k(h<t) := α
IG
m,k(h<t)(ht−k:t−1) (7)
Naturally, this is only defined for k < m, t, since the expedi-
tion function can’t accept a history fragment of length ≥ m,
and t− k must be positive. Note also that if k = 0, ht−k:t−1
evaluates to the empty string, .
1Ties in the argmax are broken arbitrarily.
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The reason Inq doesn’t ignore expeditions that started in
the past is that Inq must have some chance of actually ex-
ecuting the whole expedition (for every expedition). If the
probability of completing an expedition is 0, one cannot use
it for a bound on Inq’s belief-accuracy.
Definition 2. Let ρ(h<t,m, k) be the probability of taking
the m-k exploratory action after observing a history h<t.
ρ(h<t,m, k) :=
min
{
1
m2(m+ 1)
, ηV IG(αIGm,k(h<t), h<t−k)
}
(8)
where η is an exploration constant.
Note in the definition of ρ(h<t,m, k) that the probability
of following an expedition goes to 0 if the expected informa-
tion gain from that expedition goes to 0. The first term in the
min ensures the probabilities will not sum to more than 1.
The total probability of exploration is defined:
β(h<t) :=
∑
m∈N
∑
k<m,t
ρ(h<t,m, k) ≤
∑
m∈N
∑
k<m,t
1
m2(m+ 1)
≤
∑
m∈N
∑
k<m
1
m2(m+ 1)
= 1 (9)
The feature that makes Inq inquisitive is that ρ(h<t,m, k)
is proportional to the expected information gain from the m-
k expedition, V IG(αIGm,k(h<t), h<t−k). Note that completing
an m-step expedition requires randomly deciding to explore
in that way onm separate occasions. While this may seem in-
efficient, if the agent always got boxed into long expeditions,
the value of its policy would plummet infinitely often.
Finally, Inq’s policy pi†, defined in Algorithm 1, takes the
m-k exploratory action with probability ρ(·,m, k), and takes
the exploitative action otherwise.2
Algorithm 1 Inquisitive Reinforcement Learner’s Policy pi†
1: while True do
2: calculate ρ(h<t,m, k) for all m and for all k <
min{m, t}
3: take action aIGm,k(h<t) with probability ρ(h<t,m, k)
4: take action a∗(h<t) with probability 1− β(h<t)
4 Strong Asymptotic Optimality
Here we present our central result: that the value of pi† ap-
proaches the optimal value. We present the theorem, moti-
vate the result, and proceed to the proof. We recommend the
reader have Appendix A at hand for quickly looking up defi-
nitions and notation.
Before presenting the theorem, we clarify an assumption,
and define the optimal value. We call the true environment
2This algorithm is written in a simplified way that does not halt,
but if a real number in [0, 1] is sampled first, the actions can be as-
signed to disjoint intervals successively until the sampled real num-
ber lands in one of them.
µ, and we assume that µ ∈ M. For M the class of com-
putable environments, this is a very unassuming assumption.
The optimal value is simply the value of the optimal policy
with respect to the true environment:
V ∗µ (h<t) := sup
pi∈Π
V piµ (h<t) = V
pi∗µ
µ (h<t) (10)
Recall also that we have assumed the agent has a bounded
horizon in the sense that ∀ε ∃m ∀t : Γt+m/Γt ≤ ε. The
Strong Asymptotic Optimality theorem is that under these
conditions, the value of Inq’s policy approaches the optimal
value with probability 1, when actions are sampled from Inq’s
policy and observations and rewards are sampled from the
true environment µ.
Theorem 3 (Strong Asymptotic Optimality). As t→∞,
V ∗µ (h<t)− V pi
†
µ (h<t)→ 0 with Ppi
†
µ -prob. 1
where µ ∈M is the true environment.
For a Bayesian agent, uncertainty about on-policy obser-
vations goes to 0. Since “on-policy” for Inq includes, with
some probability, all maximally informative expeditions, Inq
eventually has little uncertainty about the result of any course
of action, and can therefore successfully select the optimal
course. For any fixed horizon, Inq’s mixture measure ξ ap-
proaches the true environment µ.
We use the following notation for a particular KL-
divergence that plays a central role in the proof:
KL
h<t,n
(Ppiν1 ||Ppiν2) :=
∑
h′∈Hn
Ppiν1(h
′|h<t) log
Ppiν1(h
′|h<t)
Ppiν2(h
′|h<t)
(11)
This quantifies the difference between the expected observa-
tions of two different environments that would arise in the
next n timesteps when following policy pi. KLh<t,∞ denotes
the limit of the above as n → ∞, which exists by [Orseau et
al., 2013, proof of Theorem 3].
In dealing with the KL-divergence, we simplify matters by
asserting that 0 log 0 := 0, and 0 log 00 := 0.
We begin with a lemma that equates the information gain
value of an expedition with the expected prediction error. The
KL-divergence on the right hand side represents how different
ν and ξ appear when following the expedition in question.
Lemma 4.
V IG(αm, h<t) =
∑
ν∈M
w(ν|h<t) KL
h<t,m
(
Pα
m
ν
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Pαmξ )
Proofs of Lemmas appear in Appendix B.
Recall that w(ν|h<t) is the posterior weight that Inq as-
signs to the environment ν after observing h<t. We show that
the infimum of this value is strictly positive with probability
1.
Lemma 5. inft w(µ|h<t) > 0 w.Ppiµ-p. 1
Next, we show that every exploration probability
ρ(h<t,m, k) goes to 0. From here, all “w.p.1” statements
mean with Ppi
†
µ -probability 1, if not otherwise specified.
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Lemma 6.
ρ(h<t,m, k)
t→∞→ 0 w.p.1
The essence of the proof is that with a finite-entropy prior,
there is only a finite amount of information to gain, so the
expected information gain (and the exploration probability)
goes to 0.
Next, we show that the total exploration probability goes
to 0:
Lemma 7.
β(h<t)→ 0 w.p.1
Lemma 8 shows that the probabilities assigned by ξ con-
verge to those of µ.
Lemma 8. ∀m ∈ N, ht:t+m−1 ∈ Hm, αm :
⋃m−1
i=0 Hi →A:
Pα
m
µ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)− Pα
m
ξ (ht:t+m−1|h<t) t→∞→ 0 w.p.1
The proof of Lemma 8 roughly follows the following argu-
ment: if all exploration probabilities go to 0, then the infor-
mativeness of the maximally informative expeditions goes to
0, so the informativeness of all expeditions goes to 0, mean-
ing the prediction error goes to 0.
Finally, we prove the Strong Asymptotic Optimality Theo-
rem: V ∗µ (h<t)− V pi
†
µ (h<t)→ 0 with Ppi
†
µ -prob. 1.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let ε > 0. Since the agent has a
bounded horizon, there exists anm such that for all t, Γt+mΓt ≤
ε. Recall
V ∗µ (h<t) =
1
Γt
Epi
∗
µ
µ
[ ∞∑
k=t
γkrk
∣∣∣∣ h<t
]
(12)
Using the m from above, let
V ∗\mµ (h<t) :=
1
Γt
Epi
∗
µ
µ
[
t+m−1∑
k=t
γkrk
∣∣∣∣ h<t
]
(13)
Since rt ∈ [0, 1],
|V ∗µ (h<t)− V ∗\mµ (h<t)| ≤
Γt+m
Γt
≤ ε (14)
We continue from there:
V ∗µ (h<t)
≤ V ∗\mµ (h<t) + ε
=
1
Γt
∑
ht:t+m−1∈Hm
P
pi∗µ
µ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)
t+m−1∑
k=t
γkrk + ε
(a)
∃T1 ∀t>T1≤ 1
Γt
∑
ht:t+m−1∈Hm
P
pi∗µ
ξ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)
t+m−1∑
k=t
γkrk + 2ε
(b)
≤ 1
Γt
Epi
∗
µ
ξ
[ ∞∑
k=t
γkrk
∣∣∣∣ h<t
]
+ 2ε
(c)
≤ 1
Γt
Epi
∗
ξ
ξ
[ ∞∑
k=t
γkrk
∣∣∣∣ h<t
]
+ 2ε
(d)
≤ 1
Γt
∑
ht:t+m−1∈Hm
P
pi∗ξ
ξ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)
t+m−1∑
k=t
γkrk + 3ε
(e)
∃T2 ∀t>T2≤ 1
Γt
∑
ht:t+m−1∈Hm
P
pi∗ξ
µ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)
t+m−1∑
k=t
γkrk + 4ε
(f)
∃T3 ∀t>T3≤ 1
Γt
∑
ht:t+m−1∈Hm
Ppi
†
µ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)∏t+m−1
k=t (1− β(h<k))
t+m−1∑
k=t
γkrk
+ 4ε
≤ 1
Γt
∑
ht:t+m−1∈Hm
Ppi
†
µ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)
(1−maxt≤k<t+m β(h<k))m
t+m−1∑
k=t
γkrk
+ 4ε
(g)
∃T4,ε′>0 ∀t>T4≤ 1
Γt
∑
ht:t+m−1∈Hm
Ppi
†
µ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)
(1− ε′)m
t+m−1∑
k=t
γkrk
+ 4ε
(h)
≤ 1
(1− ε′)mΓtE
pi†
µ
[ ∞∑
k=t
γkrk
∣∣∣∣ h<t
]
+ 4ε
=
1
(1− ε′)mV
pi†
µ (h<t) + 4ε
= V pi
†
µ (h<t) + 4ε+ (
1
(1− ε′)m − 1)V
pi†
µ (h<t)
(i)
≤ V pi†µ (h<t) + 4ε+ (
1
(1− ε′)m − 1) (15)
(a), (e), (f), and (g) all hold with probability 1. (a) fol-
lows from Lemma 8: for all m, Ppiξ (·|h<t) → Ppiµ(·|h<t)
for all conditional probabilities of histories of length m, with
probability 1, and the countable sum is bounded (by Γt). (b)
follows from adding more non-negative terms to the sum. (c)
follows pi∗ξ being the ξ-optimal policy, and therefore it ac-
crues at least as much expected reward in environment ξ as
pi∗µ does. (d) follows from
∑∞
k=t+m γk/Γt = Γt+m/Γt ≤ ε,
and rt ∈ [0, 1]. (e) follows from Lemma 8 just as (a) did.
(f) follows because the product in the denominator is the
probability that pi† mimics pi∗ξ for m consecutive timesteps,
and by Lemma 7 there is a time after which this probabil-
ity is uniformly strictly positive. (g) follows from Lemma
7: β(h<k) → 0 with probability 1. (h) follows from adding
more non-negative terms to the sum. Finally, (i) follows from
the value being normalized to [0, 1] by Γt.
∀δ > 0 ∃ε > 0, ε′ > 0 : 4ε + ( 1(1−ε′)m − 1) < δ. Let-
ting T = max{T1, T2, T3, T4}, we can combine the equa-
tions above to give
∀δ > 0 ∃T ∀t > T : V ∗µ (h<t)−V pi
†
µ (h<t) < δ w.p.1 (16)
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Since V ∗µ (h<t) ≥ V pi
†
µ (h<t),
V ∗µ (h<t)− V pi
†
µ (h<t)→ 0 w.p.1 (17)
Strong Asymptotic Optimality is not a guarantee of effi-
cacy; consider an agent that “commits suicide” on the first
timestep, and thereafter receives a reward of 0 no matter what
it does. This agent is asymptotically optimal, but not very
useful. In general, when considering many environments with
many different “traps,” bounded regret is impossible to guar-
antee [Hutter, 2005], but one can still demand from a rein-
forcement learner that it make the best of whatever situation
it finds itself in by correctly identifying (in the limit) the op-
timal policy.
We suspect that strong asymptotic optimality would not
hold if Inq had an unbounded horizon, since its horizon of
concern may grow faster than it can learn about progres-
sively more long-term dynamics of the environment. Go-
ing more into the technical details, let ∆kt be, roughly “at
time t, how much does ξ differ from µ regarding predictions
about the next k timesteps?” A lemma in our proof is that
∀k limt→∞∆kt = 0, but this does not imply, for example,
that limz→∞∆zz = 0. If the horizon which is necessary
to predict is growing over time, Inq might not be strongly
asymptotically optimal.
Indeed, we tenuously suspect that it is impossible for an
agent with an unbounded time horizon to be strongly asymp-
totically optimal in the class of all computable environments.
If that is true, then the assumptions that our result relies
on (namely that the true environment is computable, and
the agent has a bounded horizon) are the bare minimum for
strong asymptotic optimality to be possible.
Inq is not computable; in fact, no computable policy can be
strongly asymptotically optimal in the class of all computable
environments (Lattimore, et al. [2011] show this for deter-
ministic policies, but a simple modification extends this to
stochastic policies). For many smaller environment classes,
however, Inq would be computable, for example if M is fi-
nite, and perhaps for decidable M in general. The central
result, that inquisitiveness is an effective exploration strategy,
applies to any Bayesian agent.
5 Experimental Results
We compared Inq with other known weakly asymptotically
optimal agents, Thompson sampling and BayesExp [Latti-
more and Hutter, 2014a], in the grid-world environment us-
ing AIXIjs [Aslanides, 2017] which has previously been used
to compare asymptotically optimal agents [Aslanides et al.,
2017]. We tested in 10 × 10 grid-worlds, and 20 × 20 grid-
worlds, both with a single dispenser with probability of dis-
pensing reward 0.75; that is, if the agent enters that cell, the
probability of a reward of 1 is 0.75. Following the conven-
tions of [Aslanides et al., 2017] we averaged over 50 simula-
tions, used discount factor γ = 0.99, 600 MCTS samples, and
planning horizon of 6. The planning horizon restricts m, and
the number of MCTS samples is an input to ρUCT [Silver and
Veness, 2010], which we use instead of expectimax. The al-
gorithm for the approximate version of Inq is in Appendix C.
The code used for this experiment is available online at https:
//github.com/ejcatt/aixijs, and this version of Inq can be run in
the browser at https://ejcatt.github.io/aixijs/demo.html#inq.
We found that using small values for η, specifically η ≤ 1
worked well. For our experiments we chose η = 1.
In the 10 × 10 grid-worlds Inq performed comparably to
both BayesExp and Thompson sampling. However in the
20×20 grid-worlds Inq performed comparably to BayesExp,
and outperformed Thompson sampling. This is likely because
when the Thomspon Sampling Agent samples an environ-
ment with a reward dispenser that is inaccessible within its
planning horizon, the agent acts randomly rather than seek-
ing new cells. This is contrast to Inq and BayesExp which
always have an incentive to explore the frontier of cells that
have not been visited. This is especially relevant in the larger
grid where the Thomspon sampling agent is more likely to act
as if the dispenser is deep in uncharted territory, rather than
nearby. In a grid-world, good exploration is just about vis-
iting new states, which both Inq and BayesExp successfully
seek.
Figure 2: 10× 10 Grid-worlds
Figure 3: 20× 20 Grid-worlds
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6 Conclusion
We have shown that it is possible for an agent with a bounded
horizon to be strongly asymptotically optimal in the class of
all computable environments. No existing RL agent has as
strong an optimality guarantee as Inq. The nature of the ex-
ploration regime that accomplishes this is perhaps of wider
interest. We formalize an agent that gets distracted from re-
ward maximization by its inquisitiveness: the more it expects
to learn from an expedition, the more inclined it is to take it.
We have confirmed experimentally that inquisitiveness is
a practical and effective exploration strategy for Bayesian
agents with manageable model classes.
There are two main avenues for future work we would like
to see. The first regards possible extensions of inquisitive-
ness: we have defined inquisitiveness for Bayesian agents
with countable model-classes, but inquisitiveness could also
be defined for a Bayesian agent with a continuous model
class, such as a Q-learner using a Bayesian Neural Network.
The second avenue regards the theory of strong asymptotic
optimality itself: is Inq strongly asymptotically optimal for
more farsighted discounters? If not, can it be modified to ac-
complish that? Or is it indeed impossible for an agent with
an unbounded horizon to be strongly asymptotically optimal
in the class of computable environments? Answers to these
questions, besides being interesting in their own right, will
likely inform the design of tractable exploration strategies, in
the same way that this work has done.
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Appendices
A Definitions and Notation – Quick Reference
H := A×O ×R
h<t ∈ Ht−1
ht:k ∈ Hk−t+1
µ, ν ∈M
µ, ν : H∗ ×A O ×R
pi : H∗  A

typical meaning of certain notation
Ppiν () := 1; P
pi
ν (haor) := P
pi
ν (h)pi(a|h)ν(or|ha)
w(ν) := 2−K(ν)
Ppiξ (·) :=
∑
ν∈M
w(ν) Ppiν (·)
w(ν|h) := w(ν)P
pi
ν (h)
Ppiξ (h)
winf(µ|h1:∞) := inf
k∈N
w(µ|h<k)
ξ(or|ha) :=
∑
ν∈M
w(ν|h)ν(or|ha)
IG(ht:t+k−1|h<t) :=
∑
ν∈M
w(ν|h<t+k−1) log w(ν|h<t+k−1)
w(ν|h<t) for h<t ∈ H
t−1, h′ ∈ Hk
V IG(αm, h<t) :=
∑
ht:t+m−1∈Hm
Pα
m
ξ (h<t+m|h<t) IG(ht:t+m−1|h<t)
αIGm,k(h<t) := argmax
αm :
⋃m−1
i=0 Hi→A
V IG(αm, h<t−k)
aIGm,k(h<t) := α
IG
m,k(h<t)(ht−k:t−1)
V piν (h<t) :=
1
Γt
Epiν [
∞∑
k=t
γkrk|h<t]
a∗(h<t) := pi∗ξ (h<t)
V ∗ν (h<t) := sup
pi∈Π
V piν (h<t) = V
pi∗ν
ν (h<t)
ρ(h<t,m, k) := max{ 1
m2(m+ 1)
, ηV IG(αIGm,k(h<t), h<t−k)}
pi†(a|h<t) :=
∑
m∈N
∑
k<m,t
ρ(h<t,m, k)[[a = a
IG
m,k(h<t)]] + (1− β(h<t,m, k))[[a = a∗(h<t)]]
KL
h<t,n
(Ppiν1 ||Ppiν2) :=
∑
h′∈Hn
Ppiν1(h
′|h<t) log
Ppiν1(h
′|h<t)
Ppiν2(h
′|h<t)
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B Proofs of Lemmas
We begin with a lemma that equates the information gain value of an expedition with the expected prediction error. The
KL-divergence on the right hand side represents how different ν and ξ appear when following the expedition in question.
Lemma 4.
V IG(αm, h<t) =
∑
ν∈M
w(ν|h<t) KL
h<t,m
(
Pα
m
ν
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Pαmξ )
Proof. This result is shown in [Orseau et al., 2013, Equation 4].
Recall that w(ν|h<t) is the posterior weight that Inq assigns to the environment ν after observing h<t. We show that the
infimum of this value is strictly positive with probability 1.
Lemma 5. inft w(µ|h<t) > 0 w.Ppiµ-p. 1
Proof. Suppose inft w(µ|h<t) = 0. w(µ|h<t) > 0 for all histories generated by Ppiµ. Therefore, inft w(µ|h<t) = 0 =⇒
lim inft→∞ w(µ|h<t) = 0, and lim supt→∞ w(µ|h<t)−1 =∞. We show that this has probability 0.
Let
zt := w(µ|h≤t)−1 =
Ppiξ (h≤t)
Ppiµ(h≤t)
w(µ)−1 (18)
I first show that zt is a µ-martingale.
Epiµ[zt|h<t] = w(µ)−1
∑
ht∈H
Ppiµ(ht|h<t)
Ppiξ (h≤t)
Ppiµ(h≤t)
= w(µ)−1
∑
ht∈H P
pi
ξ (h≤t)
Ppiµ(h<t)
= w(µ)−1
Ppiξ (h<t)
Ppiµ(h<t)
= zt−1 (19)
By the martingale convergence theorem zt → f(ω) < ∞ w.p.1, for ω ∈ Ω, the sample space, and some f : Ω → R.
Therefore, inft w(µ|h<t) > 0 w.p.1.
Next we show that every exploration probability ρ(h<t,m, k) goes to 0. From here, all “w.p.1” statements mean with
Ppi
†
µ -probability 1, if not otherwise specified.
Lemma 6.
ρ(h<t,m, k)
t→∞→ 0 w.p.1
Proof. ρ(h<t,m, k) = ρ(h<t−k,m, 0), so we need only show that ρ(h<t,m, 0) → 0 w.p.1. We do this by showing that the
expectation of ρ(h<t,m, 0)m+1 is summable. (This is a stronger result, since it implies that it is summable with probability
1, so the probability that it is greater than ε infinitely often is 0.) A bit of notational background: 0 ∈ N, and mN + i =
{i, i+m, i+ 2m, ...}. Each equation and inequality is explained below.
w(µ)Epi
†
µ
∑
t∈mN+i
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m+1
(a)
≤
∑
ν∈M
w(ν)Epi
†
ν
∑
t∈mN+i
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m+1
(b)
= Epi
†
ξ
∑
t∈mN+i
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m+1
(c)
≤ Epi†ξ
∑
t∈mN+i
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
mηV IG(αIGm,0, h<t)
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(d)
= η
∑
t∈mN+i
E
h<t∼Ppi†ξ
[
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m E
ht:t+m−1∼P
αIGm,0
ξ
[IG(ht:t+m−1|h<t)]
]
(e)
= η
∑
t∈mN+i
E
h<t∼Ppi†ξ
 ∑
ht:t+m−1∈Hm
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m P
αIGm,0
ξ (ht:t+m−1) [IG(ht:t+m−1|h<t)]

(f)
≤ η
∑
t∈mN+i
E
h<t∼Ppi†ξ
 ∑
ht:t+m−1∈Hm
Ppi
†
ξ (ht:t+m−1) [IG(ht:t+m−1|h<t)]

(g)
= η
∑
t∈mN+i
Epi
†
ξ IG(ht:t+m−1|h<t)
(h)
= η Epi
†
ξ
∑
t∈mN+i
∑
ν∈M
w(ν|h<t+m) log w(ν|h<t+m)
w(ν|h<t)
(i)
= η
∑
t∈mN+i
∑
ν∈M
Epi
†
ξ
w(ν)ν(or<t+m|a<t+m)
ξ(or<t+m|a<t+m) log
w(ν|h<t+m)
w(ν|h<t)
(j)
= η
∑
t∈mN+i
∑
ν∈M
Epi
†
ν w(ν) log
w(ν|h<t+m)
w(ν|h<t)
(k)
= lim
N→∞
η
N−1∑
k=0
∑
ν∈M
Epi
†
ν w(ν) log
w(ν|h<mk+i+m)
w(ν|h<mk+i)
(l)
= lim
N→∞
η
∑
ν∈M
Epi
†
ν w(ν) log
N−1∏
k=0
w(ν|h<m(k+1)+i)
w(ν|h<mk+i)
(m)
= lim
N→∞
η
∑
ν∈M
Epi
†
ν w(ν) log
w(ν|h<mN+i)
w(ν|h<i)
(n)
≤ η
∑
ν∈M
Epi
†
ν w(ν) log
1
w(ν|h<i)
(o)
= η
∑
ν∈M
Epi
†
ν w(ν) log
1
w(ν)
w(ν)
w(ν|h<i)
(p)
= η
∑
ν∈M
w(ν) log
1
w(ν)
+ η
∑
ν∈M
Epi
†
ν w(ν) log
w(ν)
w(ν|h<i)
(q)
= ηEnt(w) + η
∑
h<i∈Hi
∑
ν∈M
w(ν) Ppi
†
ν (h<i) log
w(ν)
w(ν|h<i)
(r)
= ηEnt(w) + η
∑
h<i∈Hi
∑
ν∈M
w(ν|h<i) Ppi
†
ξ (h<i) log
w(ν)
w(ν|h<i)
(s)
= ηEnt(w)− η Epi†ξ [IG(h<i|)]
(t)
≤ ηEnt(w) (u)< ∞ (20)
For multiple steps in this derivation, note that the information gain is non-negative; this is a property of the KL-divergence. (a)
follows from the l.h.s. being one of the non-negative summands of the r.h.s. (b) follows from the definition of ξ. (c) follows
from the definition of ρ. (d) substitutes V IG for its definition. (e) expands the definition of the expectation. (f) follows because
pi† mimics αIGm,0 for m consecutive timesteps with probability
∏m−1
i=0 ρ(h<t+i,m, i) = ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m, so the probability
of any history under Ppi
†
ξ is at least the probability of that history under P
αIGm,0
ξ times ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m. (g) combines the two
expectations, which are now with respect to the same probability measure. (h) expands the definition of the information gain.
(i) rearranges the expectations and the sums, and expands w(ν|h<t+m) according to Bayes’ rule. (j) converts the expectation to
a expectation with respect to a different probability measure through simple cancellation. (k) implements a change of variable
from t to mk + i. (l) moves a sum inside the logarithm. (m) cancels out all terms expect the numerator of the last term and the
denominator of the first. (n) follows from all posterior weights being ≤ 1. (o) and (p) are obvious. (q) applies the definition of
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the entropy of a distribution Ent(·), and expands the expectation. (r) changes the variable in the expectation; this is the reverse
of (i) and (j). (s) applies the definition of the information gain (after inverting the fraction in the logarithm). (t) follows from
the non-negativity of the information gain. And (u) is shown in [Orseau et al., 2013, Proposition 13].
Finally,
Epi
†
µ
∞∑
t=0
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m+1 =
m−1∑
i=0
Epi
†
µ
∑
t∈mN+i
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m+1
(20)
≤
m−1∑
i=0
ηEnt(w)
w(µ)
=
mηEnt(w)
w(µ)
<∞ (21)
Now, we show that the total exploration probability goes to 0:
Lemma 7.
β(h<t)→ 0 w.p.1
Proof.
β(h<t) =
∑
m∈N
min{m−1,t}∑
k=0
ρ(h<t,m, k)
=
∑
m∈N
min{m−1,t}∑
k=0
min
{
1
m2(m+ 1)
, V IGm,k(h<t)
}
(22)
Each of the terms in the sum approaches 0 with probability 1 by Lemma 6, and because ρ(h<t,m, k) = ρ(h<t−k,m, 0).
Suppose by contradiction β(h<t) > ε > 0 infinitely often. There exists an M such that
∞∑
m=M
min{m−1,t}∑
k=0
ρ(h<t,m, k) <
∞∑
m=M
m−1∑
k=0
1
m2(m+ 1)
< ε/2 (23)
for all t. With that M , then if β(h<t) > ε infinitely often, it must be the case that
∑M−1
m=0
∑m−1
k=0 ρ(h<t,m, k) > ε/2 infinitely
often, but this is a finite sum of terms that all approach 0, a contradiction.
Lemma 8 shows that the probabilities assigned by ξ converge to those of µ.
Lemma 8. ∀m ∈ N, ht:t+m−1 ∈ Hm, αm :
⋃m−1
i=0 Hi → A:
Pα
m
µ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)− Pα
m
ξ (ht:t+m−1|h<t) t→∞→ 0 w.p.1
Proof. Suppose that 0 < ε ≤ (Pαmµ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)− Pα
m
ξ (ht:t+m−1|h<t))2 for some ht:t+m−1.
ε ≤ (Pαmµ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)− Pα
m
ξ (ht:t+m−1|h<t))2
(a)
≤ KL
h<t,m
(
Pα
m
µ
∣∣∣∣∣∣Pαmξ )
(b)
≤
∑
ν∈M
w(ν|h<t)
w(µ|h<t) KLh<t,m
(
Pα
m
ν
∣∣∣∣∣∣Pαmξ )
(c)
=
1
w(µ|h<t)V
IG(αm, h<t)
(d)
≤ 1
infk w(µ|h<k)V
IG(αm, h<t)
(e)
≤ 1
infk w(µ|h<k)V
IG(αIGm,0(h<t), h<t) (24)
(a) is a result from information theory known as the entropy inequality. (b) follows from the non-negativity of the KL-
divergence, and the l.h.s. being one of the summands of the r.h.s. (c) follows from Lemma 4. (d) follows from the definition of
the infimum. And (e) follows from the fact that αIGm,0(h<t) maximizes V
IG(·, h<t), by definition.
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Therefore,
(Pα
m
µ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)− Pα
m
ξ (ht:t+m−1|h<t))2 ≥ ε i.o.
implies V IG(αIGm,0(h<t), h<t) ≥ ε inf
k
w(µ|h<k) i.o.
which implies ρ(h<t,m, 0) ≥ min{ 1
m2(m+ 1)
, ε inf
k
w(µ|h<k)} i.o.
which implies
∞∑
t=0
ρ(h<t,m, 0)
m+1 =∞ or inf
k
w(µ|h<k) = 0
This has probability 0 by Lemmas 6 and 5. Thus, with probability 1, Pα
m
µ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)− Pα
m
ξ (ht:t+m−1|h<t)→ 0.
C Approximation of Inq
Following Aslanides [2017], our approximation of Inq calls ρUCT [Silver and Veness, 2010] as a subroutine in place of
expectimax.
Algorithm 2 Approximation of Inquisitive Reinforcement Learner’s Policy
Require: MCTS Samples, horizon, γ
Initialize: uniform prior over model class
1: while True do
2: for all m ≤ horizon and k < min{m, t} do
3: using information gain as reward, aIGm,k ∼ ρUCT(h<t−k,MCTS samples,m, γ)
4: ρ(m, k) = min{information-gain-value of aIGm,k, 1/(m2(m+ 1))}
5: using the actual reward, a∗ ∼ ρUCT(h<t,MCTS samples, horizon, γ)
6: take action aIGm,k with probability ρ(m, k) for all m ≤ horizon and k < min{m, t} else take action a∗
7: update posterior from observation and reward
13
